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AFRICAN ECONOM IC UNIFICATION: SOM E PERSPECTIVES PATHS AND
PROBLEMS
B y  R e g in a l d  H . G r e e n *
Regional economic integration as a framework for, and a means to, accelerating economic 
development is a topic of political economy far more than of “pure” economic analysis. 
Indeed, in Africa today, one is inclined to conclude that the political problems and uncertainties 
are far more critical than economic so far as achieving economic unification either on a conti­
nental or a sub-continental basis is concerned.
To some extent, these comments are true of all economic policy issues. However, they are 
especially relevant to full scale economic integration (as opposed to gestures or half measures 
such as the African and Malagasy Organization for Economic Cooperation (OAMCE) the 
West African Customs Unions or the Sahel-Benin Entente) for three reasons:
1. The range and scale of the impact of true economic unification is much wider than that 
of almost any other policy. As both the authors of G hana’s Seven-Year P lan1 and of 
the Economic Commission for Africa’s study “ Coordination of Development Plans 
In Africa” 2 have pointed out, development planning must be based on clear assum- 
tions as to the limits of the economic unit concerned. Economic unification will entail 
concentration on fewer selected projects of larger scale and higher efficiency; projects 
which, however, would be totally non-viable in a framework of continued fragmented 
national planning.
2. Economic integration is not easily or costlessly reversible. To separate a unified econo­
my into its component territorial units (especially if the break up is less than amicable) 
is disruptive and potentially catastrophic for at least some of the units. The problems 
experienced by Senegal and Congo (Brazzaville) on the break up of French West and 
Equatorial African Colonial Federations, the economic crises which came at the collapse 
of the Mali Federation and the dim economic future for Southern Rhodesian industry 
facing Zambian national planning and customs barriers illustrate this point.
3. Economic integration movements—when e.Tective—are usually part, and often a 
secondary part, of broader socio-political movements.3 The “European Idea” and 
E.E.C. are integrally related (if separable) and the connections between varying expres­
sions of political and economic Pan-Africanism are even closer.
Programmes and institutions directed to the resolution of challenges in political economy 
are relevant only if they serve and are seen to serve the goals of governments and other groups 
wielding political power. A study of African national development plans and programmes 
suggests that the most common politico-economic objectives a re :4
B ased on a  p ap er  p resented  to  the  A nnual C onference o f  the  E conom ic Society o f  G hana , Ju ly  1964. T hanks are  due to  J . H . 
M ensah, now  o f  the  E conom ic C om m ission fo r  A frica, P rofessor Jan  D rew now ski now  o f  the  U N , S. H . H ym er o f  Yale, and 
m em bers o f  the  E C A  sta ff fo r helpful criticism s an d  com m ents on  earlier versions o f  th is paper and the  argum ents used in  it.
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1. Economic reconstruction in the sense of reducing dependence on any one export 
market or firm, increasing national production of locally used products, and creating a 
more national economy in terms of ability to take public economic decisions on the 
basis of national interests and goals rather than primarily in response to foreign econo­
mic interest group pressures;
2. Economic expansion especially in the fields of modernized agriculture and of industriali­
zation ;
3. Modernization in terms of acquiring technologically advanced capital cities, industrial 
plants, agricultural machinery, and transportation equipment;
4. Augmented standards of living and (although the linkage is not always clearly made) 
increased output per head to support them ;
5. Better and more broadly available social services particularly education, health, and 
urban housing;
6. Lessening “economic distance" between African and industrial (capitalist or socialist) 
states. A somewhat lesser number of African states specifically stress lessened economic 
inequality between individuals and regions within African states and within Africa.
One need not take all the professions at face value or assume a high level of operational 
efficiency in programme implementation to attribute meaning to this set of goals. A majority 
o f African governments actively seek them ; the others either passively agree with them or feel 
forced to espouse them lest they follow in the paths of Abbe Youlou, President Maga, and 
King Farouk. In any event, a far reaching proposed economic programme will have little or 
no chance of serious consideration, much less acceptance, unless it serves and or appears to 
serve the rapid attainment of these ends.
At first glance nothing seems less relevant to African economic development, much less the 
politico-economic goals of African Governments, than economic integration as traditionally 
formulated and analysed. The theory of economic integration began in the world of Vinerian 
tariff and neo-Pigovian welfare economics. Even as modified, it remains predominantly con­
cerned with alternative equilibrium states, with narrow changes in allocational efficiency, with 
evaluation of marginal gains and losses for member and non-member states.5
This is the world of the Marshallian Synthesis, of the unalterable division of primary 
producing and industrial nations, of “nature does not make haste.” It is a  world not simply 
alien and irrelevant to, but totally rejected by, African political decision makers because it 
was the economic world order of colonialism and is the world economic order in which per 
capita incomes continue to grow more rapidly for the rich—and not at all in much of Africa.6
Rapid economic development depends on radical structural (not marginal) change. By its 
nature, a programme of rapid economic growth must refute “natura non facit saltum” * ; if 
nature will not make haste policy must. The only world of economic policy in which the
N atu re  does no t m ake haste
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politico-economic goals of African governments have any chance of realization is one in which 
Dudley Seers’ dictum “The proponents of any major economic policy measure in an under­
developed economy are under an obligation to show how this measure will stimulate growth.” 7 
is central.
In Africa, the effects of economic unification must be structural and dynamic rather than 
static and marginal i f  they are to be significant.8 The common argument that primary product 
exporters cannot usefully integrate because they have nothing to trade with each other represents 
a failure to comprehend the structural differences between the nationally integrated, industria­
lised economies of modern theory and the structurally biased, trade oriented, fragmented 
economies of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. However, the criticism does 
demonstrate why a free trade area may well have no significant impact. As in the case of the 
Equatorial Customs Union, there may be neither production for “home” markets nor trans­
portation facilities among union members.9
The critical issues in economic integration analysis in Africa are economic size, linkages 
and growth poles (poles de croissance), and the creation of a radically different production 
pattern based on a new specialization and division of labour.10 While particularly relevant in 
the case of large scale industry11, these considerations also effect modern agriculture, power 
and river basin development, transportation, external economic relations (of the integrated 
economic unit as a whole) both in regard to trade and to foreign capital, and to some extent 
research, education, and social services.
The economic size factor is underlined by three figures. The first is the minimum national 
product for a fully integrated modern economy at income levels of $ 100-500 per capita. The 
range is $20-30 thousand million. This need for massive economic size stems from the interac­
tion of market sizes for individual goods and economies of scale in production, infrastructure, 
and research. The minimum efficient size for an industry is not that for a single plant but rather 
that size which will allow efficient production of inputs, provision of services, and undertaking 
of research. In general the lower the per capita national product, the larger the total national 
product required to sustain an efficient integrated industrial economy because of the smaller 
share spent on manufactures at lower per capita income levels.12
The second is the median national product of African states. It is about $0.3 thousand 
million. (Only five independent African states have national products above $1.0 thousand 
million while 18 have ones of less than $0.2). Last, the total domestic product of independent 
Africa is between $20 and $25 thousand million.13
In other words, the typical African state—with a population of say 4,000,000, a product 
per head of perhaps $100, and a market sector to total production ratio of say 6 : 10—-has at 
best a comparable market for processed and manufactured products to a Western European 
town of 100-150,000. A  large African economy like Ghana consumes less manufactured 
products (perhaps $500 million per year including construction and investment goods) than 
Seattle, Osaka, or Edinburgh. The market for all products other than unprocessed food of 
Paris, Warsaw, or Boston is substantially larger than that of the United Arab Republic or 
Nigeria—economically the largest of the independent African states. (South Africa is in a 
rather different class in market size. The market comparison would be with Los Angeles,
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Tokyo or Moscow; a fact which goes far to explain the existence and viability of a modern 
industrial economy in South Africa despite the economic hobbles imposed by apartheid on 
production as well as on dem and).14
Economically viable units in many lines of production including almost all basic inter­
mediate goods (e.g. chemicals, steel, fertilizer), consumer durables (e.g. automobiles) and capital 
goods (e.g. agricultural machinery) require substantially larger markets than those of most 
individual African states. All too typical is the West African country an official description of 
whose industrial sector describes it as comprising four small palm-oil expressing mills and a 
brewery. Listed plans for expansion total a fish cannery, a sawmill, an abattoir.
However, as the ECA’s regional and continental studies demonstrate, adequate African 
multinational markets exist for a limited number of efficient p lants.12 National planning will 
result in a large number of high cost, small plants e.g. steel mills of which Nigeria is building- 
two while Ghana, Niger, Liberia and others are engaged in scrap rerolling, pig iron smelting 
and steel mill planning despite detailed evidence that for the regional market to be satisfied at 
the lowest cost what is required is one large coastal mill and a smaller interior one.16
The ECA-OAU West African Industrial Coordination Conference at Bamako in October, 
1964, made potentially significant progress toward a rational regional iron and steel plan and 
some progress in regard to fertilizers, textiles, and cement. It was, however, handicapped both 
by incomplete background studies and the fact that there were distinctly less plants to be 
allocated than participants. M auritania declined to sign the final iron and steel agreement on 
the first ground and Guinea, probably primarily as a result o f the second.17
The autarchic development pattern has three results:
1. it raises the investment outlay required for any given increase in production as well as 
the unit cost of goods produced;
2. it creates future cost problems (such as Chile and other Latin American states now 
experience) because high cost basic and intermediate products become high cost inputs 
in other parts of the manufacturing sector;
3. it prevents the smaller countries from developing beyond the brewery-sawmill industrial 
stage because their national markets are too thin to support even high cost plants in 
other lines o f activity.
Market unification with a limited number of efficient plants and—as a corollary—a limited 
number of industries in each country would have several advantages: 18
1. the number of potentially viable industries would be vastly increased and the average 
cost of basic and intermediate production including steel, cement, fertilizer, chemicals 
sharply reduced;
2. investment costs per unit of output would be substantially lowered;
3. linkage effects to related industries—supplies, services, users—would become quantita­
tively large enough to create growth pole impact. That is, self-expanding industrial 
complexes rather than economically isolated plants could be achieved;
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4. All African states could develop more diversified and flexible economies if production 
were substantially directed to continental or sub-continental markets.
The basic objectives of allocation and division of labour to raise efficiency via technical 
scale and external economy effects are not in principle different from standard trade and 
regional integration theory.19 The differences centre on the use of a dynamic rather than a 
static context:
1. the goal of a flexible economy with greater intersectoral flows and lower dependence on 
primary product exports is taken as given and the efficiency of alternative patterns of 
attaining this goal (autarchy or regional integration) com pared;
2. in the absence of any large industrial sectors the question is not one of current com­
plementarity or competitiveness but of creating a complementary pattern of production. 
For example, by 1980 African industrial production could increase ten fold, a third 
through import substitution for existing consumer manufactures already technically 
well within African productive capacity a third through substitution for existing imports 
of construction and intei mediate goods imports and refined fuels, and a third through 
African production to meet increased demand in these sectors:20
3. trade substitution or trade augmentation arguments become somewhat unreal. African 
extra-continental imports will grow at a rate determined basically by primary product 
and semi-processed export growth, foreign investment, and international transfers. 
Rapid internal market growth will, if anything, tend to raise the level of the latter two 
components. Im port substitution will result in a substantial restructuring of extra- 
African imports not a reduction in total value;21
4. specialization and market unification are not marginal reallocative or growth stimula­
tive devices but major tools for facilitating the creation of an economic structure in­
cluding sectors e.g. industry, raw materials for domestic use, with high income elastici­
ties of demand and levels of productivity to replace the current structure which is 
unsatisfactory on both counts.22
The urgency of making serious attempts to attain the advantages of economic unification 
is increased by two further factors. First the rate of growth o f demand for African exports is 
unlikely to exceed 3-5 per cent a year over the next decade.2 3 However, to sustain a five per 
cent rate of growth of national product without massive changes in the productive structure 
would require an eight per cent rate of increase of im ports.24 Second the longer industrial 
planning, and economic modernization in general, is carried on national lines the more in­
efficient units of production will be created. N ot only would this raise the costs of dislocation 
and lower the net gains from unification, it would create vested economic interest groups (public 
and private) bitterly opposed to it. To take an example: if Nigeria once has two steel mills and 
G hana, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Liberia and the Cameroons one each it will not 
be possible to create a rational West African steel industry, Further, because of divergent 
national costs, both the steel producing units and producers of goods using steel (whose costs 
are then tied to those of the national steel mill) of countries with highest cost mills will oppose 
economic unification.
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III
The case for economic integration in Africa is sound both in terms of analysis of possibili­
ties and in terms of its relevance to the goals listed in the first section. An increase in the rate of 
growth of national product based on a more flexible economy with a significant and growing 
modern industrial sector is desired. Economic unification can contribute to that result. Thus 
the increasing interest shown in various African (as opposed to Eurafrican schemes which are 
becoming distinctly less popular as their limitations, especially in regard to structural change 
and economic inter-dependence, as opposed to dependence, become clearer)25* economic 
coordination or unification schemes is easy to explain. The interest of political leaders and 
economic civil servants as well as of economists is both significant in quantity and serious in 
nature.
Why, then, has very little real progress been made? What are the obstacles in the way of 
significant steps to African economic coordination and unification either on the continental or 
the sub-continental level ? Five major categories appear.
The first is lack of adequate knowledge. If one is to develop Africa—or West Africa, or 
the Mahgreb—as a single economy or a highly coordinated complex of economies, detailed data 
on possible patterns of development and project location on a continental and regional (not 
simply a national) basis are required.** Similarly plans for structures of economic coordination, 
control, and policy making have to be drawn up. In Europe and Latin America the time lag 
between a high level of serious interest and major concrete results was a decade. Since 1960 
ECA 26—and other bodies including the University of East Africa 27 and University of G hana28 
—have been making substantial progress on the data collection and analytical formulation 
front and since 1963 the O.A.U. and national governments have begun to work on the institu­
tional arrangement front with increased if uneven seriousness.
The second problem is the division of benefits. This has been most ably stated by Vice Presi­
dent Rashidi Kawawa of Tanzania in noting each nation’s fears it would become a backward, 
exploited region while others profited.29 Only comprehensive plans with specific project alloca­
tion, and fiscal transfer provisions can meet this fear. A simple common market—vide those 
in East and Central Africa—will not significantly benefit and may injure the poorer terri­
tories.30*** On the other hand, sub-continental industrialization, transport, and river basin 
studies do show that economically viable plans benefitting each participating state as well as 
all states as a group can be formulated.31
Third the massive interdependence involved in full-scale integration requires very broad 
joint determination of policies and firm assurance that the structure will be lasting. The stresses 
in East Africa over industrial location, foreign trade, and tax policy (and the equally serious 
monetary policy ones which prevented the automatic currency Board’s replacement by a
•  T rue, N igeria has app lied and  Sierra Leone and  E ast A frica are  considering app lying fo r special s tand ing  sim ilar to  th a t  g rantedA ssociates in regard to  their prim ary prod uc t exports to  the  C om m on M arket. They a re  n o tab ly  not app lying fo r  A ssociate s ta tus 
and  their lim ited proposals are based no t on  any enthusiasm  fo r  E E C ’s d iscrim inato ry  trad e  and  a id  po licy  bu t on  fears th a t this 
I? J scve.rcly injure their exports unless they com e to term s w ith it. T hus these app lica tion s a re  evidence n o t o f  the  bene­fits EEC A ssociation gives participan ts bu t the dam age it does to  outsiders.
** T his problem  as noted earlier bulked large a t the  Bam ako Conference. T he  non-adherence o f  G uinea an d  M au ritan ia  to  the  ironand  steel agreem ent and  the  absence o f  definitive results on  o th e r industries cou ld , in  all p rob ab ility , have been averted  by m ore  com plete studies on m ore products.
*** C alcu la tions by Profc sor W . T. Newlyn suggest th a t T anganyika has lost m arginally  (3 %) th rou gh  C om m on M arke t m em bersh ip , a t least in  sta tic  term ?. C ertain ly Z am bia was a  m ajo r an d  M alaw i a  m arginal loser from  R hodesias-N yasaland  econom ic un ion
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single Central Bank with one nationally controlled currency) underline the first aspect and the 
difficulty of coping with them in the context of weak central institutions and politically genera­
ted uncertainty as to the future of economic union, the second32. Free market forces cannot be 
utilized for allocating industry because they will lead to overconcentration in a few countries 
(cities for that matter) with initial advantages. This centralizing tendency will clearly be 
unacceptable to the “peripheral” states.3 3
Halt fourth  problem stems from the third. If significant integration in the economic sense 
requires jo in t planning, reasonable certainty of each nation’s fulfilment of its segments of the 
jo in t plan and coordinated overall economic policy, then it cannot be achieved without a very 
high level of political unification or federation. The need for reasonable certainty of each state 
meeting national targets is often overlooked but is critical because failure in this regard will 
result in failure of input supplies and markets for the other member states even if they fulfil 
their plan segments. For example, if a West African iron and steel agreement calls for Nigerian 
production of basic steel forms and Ghanaian fabrication of certain metal products then a 
Nigerian output lag will hold back Ghanaian production and regional exports directly and also 
indirectly injure planned imports of Ghanaian metal goods.34 It is not accidental that Presi­
dents Nyerere, Bourguiba, and Nkrumah—the most active supporters of significant economic 
union, albeit on somewhat different bases and time schedules—all state that political unity in 
some form is a pre-condition for economic unity.
Finally, many foreign economic interests in Africa are opposed to economic (or political!) 
unification.35 The reasons are not always the same but the sum of the difficulties this opposi­
tion poses—particularly to the “ Associated Territories”—is substantial. However, not all 
foreign interests are opposed. As in Latin America, those firms (and their home states) 
interested in industrial investment and capital goods exports look with some favour on larger 
markets and industrial expansion.
IV
In evaluating lines of action toward economic unification three criteria appear paramount. 
First, the steps and the structures to which they lead should be significant enough to have a sub­
stantial impact on growth. Joint services, transit rights for landlocked states, limited bilateral 
trade agreements, e.g. Senegalese palm-oil and cigarettes for Guinea fruit, and customs 
unions without jo in t project citing aie peripherally useful in some contexts but do not lead to 
economic integration nor make a substantial contribution to structural change and more rapid 
development.
Economically, the most effective institutional—policy framework would be continental 
and include:
1. a continental plan formulation and coordination body;
2. a series of major multi-national projects, e.g. in coordinated river basin power-water- 
industrial development and in the creation of coordinated sub-regional transport 
systems;
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3. a continental central bank for the coordination of monetary policy to work in conjunc­
tion with the African Development Bank;
4. substantial member state initiative in project proposal, small scale development project 
initiation, and major programme implementation.
To be effective these institutions must have substantial decision making authority. Such 
authority will be granted only if they have supra-national policy making assemblies and if 
they exist in a context of close socio-political cooperation.36
Sub-regional units—as implicitly advocated by ECA—could be an intermediate stage i f  
they were economic regions. A genuine East African Economic Union and a Mahgreb indus­
trial plan are evident cases under active discussion. The institutional frames needed would be 
similar to those on a continental level. The economic case for such regional units is the same 
as—but weaker than—that for continental integration. Their lesser complexity of institutional 
and policy formulation make them potentially easier to establish, a t least technically. On the 
other hand, sub-regional planning may—if uncoordinated with other sub-regions—create new 
barriers to wider economic integration. From the point o f view of obtaining an optimal African 
economic pattern of production and trade, sub-regional groupings or agreements should be 
seen by all concerned as transitional and operated with a view to fairly rapid merger.
The East African experience casts grave doubt on how much easier it is to organize agree­
ments among small groups of countries. The April, 1964 Kampala Agreem ent37 and the 
January, 1965 East African Heads of State ratification of the Agreement as a treaty with alloca­
tions of additional regional market industries to each state, do appear to represent a major 
advance toward joint planning at least in the industrial sector. However, the collapse of 
Regional Central Bank plans largely as a result of Kenyan conservatism in regard to exchange 
control and fiduciary issue limits threatens the entire fabric of cooperation.
The very loose or very small legional schemes e.g. the current Cote d ’ Ivoire—Sierra Leone 
Liberia-Guinean and (alternatively) Senegal-JVLauritania-Vali-Guinea common market 
proposals seem unlikely to have sufficient size or impact to be very useful. The OAM CE 
(formerly Afro-Malagasy Union, formerly Brazzaville Group)* is simply not a rational econo­
mic grouping and tends to hinder serious regional initiatives. The Sahel-Benin Entente is a 
scheme for tying three poorer states to the Cote de Ivoire in return for rather low fiscal transfers 
and—were it to lead to a joint economy—could hardly help but concentrate growth in Abidjan 
to the detriment of Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta.
The second criterion for evaluation is speed of possible implementation. Passage of time 
and development on national lines create costs and barriers to economic union. The more 
rapidly steps to halt and reverse economic neo-autarchy can be taken, the higher the chances of 
success and the greater the potential gains.
The decision which could be taken in the next year is to proceed immediately toward the 
creation of an integrated, jointly planned, interdependent African economy. Four initial 
institutional developments would be required. All, at least technically, are possible within two 
years:
* N ° w (Jttly \?65) jo in t A frc-M alagasy O rgan ization  with the  add ition  o f  C ongo (Leopoldville), possib le  loss o f  C am eroon , C ongo  (Brazzaville), M auritania, C entral A frican R epublic and R w anda, an d  a  po litica l n o t econom ic  focus.
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1. A “designated product” 38 common market and project location policy to “allocate” 
new industries and to protect existing intra-African trade plans (which at least in the 
short run are critical for perhaps a dozen states).3» With a potential ten fold increase in 
the industrial sector in a decade—if adequate unified markets are created—such a plan 
need lead to no insuperable conflicts o f interest.
The great advantage of a designated product common market-planned development 
approach is that it allows a start on a limited array of products and with less than all 
the African states. This would serve both to allow concentration on those cases in 
which mutual benefits were most obvious and to allow substantial action before 
complete enough data on other sectors was available for total plan consolidation. 
The minimums in terms of participating states and products are: (a) the attainment of a 
market adequate to support eiiicient production and (b) simultaneous initial negotia­
tion on at least as many products as participating states so that there will be a concrete 
addition to productive possibilities for each country.
2. A series of multi-national projects. The Senegal, Niger, and Gambia River and Chad 
Lake Basin development proposals are examples of areas virtually requiring such multi­
national action for effectuation. Another is the creation of a transportation system 
linking and allowing unified development of the heavily populated area around the line 
running from Lusaka through the Great Lakes basin to the Southern Sudan (whether 
on a Zambia-Tanzania route or on the other side of the lakes through the Eastern 
Congo and Uganda to Kampala with lake links to Tanzania and connections with the 
East African, Congolese, and Sudan systems). Preliminary consultations and or agree­
ments have in fact, taken place on each o f these programmes.
Multi-national projects, like designated product market-planning unification, allow 
speedy and substantive initial steps strengthening the support for fuller unification. 
Again, they provide clear benefits for each participant while providing experience in 
substantive problems and procedures of making economic union work.
3. A payments union to allow free intra-continental and partial extra-continental con­
vertibility of all African currencies is needed. While current trade is largely settled in 
convertible currency (or illicit reexports of imported manufactures) this method is 
clearly not suitable to optimizing trade within a region short of foreign exchange. 
The early European Payments Union rationale and the device of internal full convertibi­
lity o f balances combined with their limited availability for external use are of relevance 
here.
4. A central economic body capable of handling the analytical and technical questions of 
the other three bodies and of developing into a continental planning board would be 
required. The ECA is not suited to this role because its structure inherently prevents 
taking economic policy and planning decisions binding on member states. ECA is 
highly useful as a data gathering, analysis presenting, advice providing, and discussion 
stimulating body and can thus complement the planning body.
Finally, any proposals must be considered in terms of political realism. From  the point of 
view of political economy a programme is of little interest—no matter what would happen 
were it implemented—if it is clearly impossible to secure its adoption.
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Total economic integration of Africa without a far higher degree of political unity than a 
majority of present African governments will accept is not practicable. The more limited initial 
programme outlined above is potentially political acceptable at least on a sub-continental level. 
Its adoption would tend to strengthen the forces supporting fuller political and economic 
Pan-Africanism.
However, even this programme requires a substantial degree of political harmony and 
coordination. To be effective the institutions created—especially the “common m arket” and 
central economic body—must be given power to take binding decisions. In a context of conti­
nental economic interdependence, these decisions will critically effect national economic 
growth and thus ability to achieve basic socio-political goals. Power to make them will—and 
indeed can responsibly—only be transferred to bodies with policy making assemblies represen­
tative of and enjoying the confidence of member states.
Prognostications as to what will happen leave the realm of political economy and enter 
that of political sooth-saying. A few guide posts do seem to exist:
1. Unifying forces are—by and large—gaining strength in Africa today, especially in the 
economic sphere;
2. On the other hand, the obstacles to Pan-Africanism (including the solidifying of 
national states with both public and private economic vested interests) are also growing;
3. Unless substantial break-throughs creating a tangible forward momentum to both 
political and economic unity are achieved within a decade, Africa will enter a period 
in which unification will be distinctly unlikely—somewhat as in Latin America after 
the failure of its initial post-liberation unification efforts;
4. A failure to attain unity on the continental level might not prevent the emergence of sub­
continental unified economies in the Mahgreb and East-Central Africa. West African 
sub-continental union (political or economic) except within a continental whole seems 
much less likely. In part this stems from the greater number of states and their smaller 
median economic size, in part from the greater diversity of colonial inheritances. In 
addition, West Africa has a far wider spectrum of state socio-political systems and 
goals than does East-Central or North Africa.
1. A ccra, 1964, pp . 15-17
2. Economic Bulletin fo r  A frica, N o . 1, 1964, E /C N . 14/239 B. A ddis A baba, 1964.
3. cf. A. E tzioni “A  Paradigm  for the  Study o f  Political U nification.”  W orld Politics, O ctober, 1962 an d  “ T he D ialectics o f  S uprana tiona l U nification”  A m erican Political Science Review, D ecem ber, 1962
4. “ Social A spects o f  A frican D evelopm ent P lan n in g : Patterns and T rends”  in Economic Bulletin fo r  A frica , N o . 1, 1964; Outlines and  Selected  Indicators o f  A frican Development Plans, E /C N . 14/336, A ddis A baba , 1965
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